Localizing Global Solidarity: Humanitarian Aid in Lesvos by Shults, Lee Michael et al.
Localizing Global Solidarity:
Humanitarian Aid in Lesvos
Lee Michael Shults*, Hanne Haaland and Hege Wallevik
Department of Global Development Studies and Social Planning, University of Agder, Kristiansand, Norway
The so-called “refugee crisis” in Lesvos, Greece provides a poignant example of situated,
local suffering that has called for the coordination of global resources to provide relief.
Some of the first to respond were local and international Citizen Initiatives for Global
Solidarity (CIGS). While a growing role for CIGS has been interpreted as a call for more
global involvement, arguments for the increased localization of relief efforts suggest the
need for aid agents to maintain a reflexive awareness of the potential for an influx of outside
assistance to disempower thosemost affected.We argue that barriers to implementing the
localization of humanitarian aid can be better understood by positioning this localization
alongside theories of global solidarity. This paper pairs theoretical contributions from the
fields of moral and political philosophy with an analysis of interview material gathered in
Lesvos between 2015 and 2019. Our goal is to use narratives of conflicting interests in
Lesvos to explore conceptual distinctions concerning solidarity and emphasize the
importance of the localization of global solidarity in humanitarian aid. We conclude that
while global solidarity represents a demanding effort to identify with distant others and
provide aid, the intensity and transformative potential of the process of “making the crisis
one’s own” through solidary engagement can overshadow the importance of local
ownership of crisis management.
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Citizen Initiatives for Global Solidarity (CIGS) play a unique role in humanitarian aid, which has
been previously explored in the context of Lesvos (Haaland and Wallevik, 2019). These small,
unofficial, and unstructured personalized aid projects “pop-up” to meet emergent needs and acute
crises (Schulpen and Huyse, 2017, 163). While CIGS are not new, they are becoming increasingly
recognized as influential aid actors (Fechter and Schwittay, 2019). Due to their flexible character,
CIGS can address unmet needs as service providers or as watchdogs for traditional aid organizations.
While some CIGS are short-lived, others maintain a strong presence over time, occasionally evolving
into larger NGOs in order to gain access to the resources offered by established humanitarian
networks (Oikonomakis, 2018, 72). The abilities of CIGS to adapt and mobilize rapidly have
challenged established conceptions of aid governance, project sustainability, and efficiency of
resource allocation.
In 2015, CIGS were among the earliest responders to the unexpected arrival of thousands of
refugees travelling across the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Lesvos. The geographical position of the
island quickly transformed Lesvos into the “epicenter of what is known as the ‘European refugee
crisis’” (Rozakou, 2017, 102). The island was not prepared to handle a refugee crisis of this scale,
especially while simultaneously struggling with the lasting effects of the 2008 financial crisis, high
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levels of unemployment, and capital controls that had been
recently imposed on the Greek banking system. However,
despite these challenges, the island community of Lesvos
attracted positive international attention for welcoming the
refugees with open arms at the start of the crisis (Cantat 2018, 8).
Particularly in the first months of the crisis, local initiatives
and international CIGS bore a great deal of responsibility for
crisis management, as the mobilization of the more established
humanitarian aid “machinery” took time. The absence of
established national and international actors at the beginning
of the crisis led to a “mistrust of government and institutionalized
charity” (Witcher, 2020, 5) among CIGS and other community-
based organizations. The anti-hierarchical resistance that many
CIGS displayed towards traditional, coordinated crisis
management has been interpreted as a critique of holes in the
international response to the humanitarian crisis, and as a
demand for an increase in “global acts of responsibility and
solidarity” that might “enable us to think beyond the
management of crisis locally” (Haaland and Wallevik, 2019,
1880). This paper builds on that analysis by connecting
aspects of competing theories of global solidarity to efforts
towards the localization of humanitarian aid, drawing on
empirical data gathered in Lesvos between 2015 and 2019. As
such, this article represents an attempt to bridge philosophical
approaches to the concept of solidarity and social scientific
research on the localization of humanitarian aid and the
evolving role of CIGS.
While there may appear to be a prima facie tension between
increased global solidarity and increased localization of aid;
existing research on solidarity in Greece has already connected
empowerment through locally run, redistributive efforts to the
potential of these “bottom-up” initiatives to critique and alter
national and international politics (Rakopoulos, 2014; Arampatzi,
2017). While the desirability of local empowerment remains
uncontroversial, the type of networked solidarity required to
provide aid in times of crisis has an unavoidable global or
international element as well. By addressing conceptual
distinctions and empirically informed connections between
global solidarity and the localization of humanitarian aid, this
paper aims to point to informative tensions and productive
similarities between these efforts.
The phrases “global solidarity” and “localization of
humanitarian aid” share two important traits. First, they have
progressive and inclusive connotations, sharing near unanimous
support at an abstract level. Second, attempts to implement these
broad concepts in practical situations often prove controversial
and complicated. We argue that these difficulties stem partially
from the fact that the meanings of these terms must be
determined case by case and contextually redefined as existing
needs are met or reinterpreted, and new needs emerge.
Killian Spandler describes the localization of humanitarian aid
as a matter of facilitating “more ownership for state and non-state
actors in close proximity to the emergencies” (2020, 2). The
challenge of applying this definition at a practical level involves
negotiating competing understandings of proximity. Using the
influx of refugees in Lesvos as an example: the local government,
the citizens of Lesvos, local initiatives, and the refugees
themselves all have radically different ideas about who needs
aid and how it should be provided. Each could make legitimate
claims to proximity to the emergency. Further complicating the
situation, none of these groups are homogenous in terms of
perspectives or goals. If it were decided that, in the interests of
local empowerment, the citizens of Lesvos should have more
ownership over the coordination of humanitarian aid efforts—the
process of providing a representative system with a sufficiently
unified agenda for achieving this goal would be daunting, if not
impossible.
There are clear parallels between the challenge of determining
which groups have a relevant sense of proximity to a
humanitarian crisis and the challenge of coordinating
overlapping efforts towards global solidarity in response to a
crisis. Before confronting several existing treatments of global
solidarity, it is important to offer a clear distinction between what
we refer to in this paper as local solidarity and global solidarity.
Local solidarity is understood here as representing a willingness
to act in the interests of one’s established in-groups, while global
solidarity represents a willingness to act in the interests of distant
out-groups. The relevant factors that constitute distance between
groups vary contextually—much like relevant senses of proximity
in the example above. Acknowledging group membership when
distinguishing between types of solidarity is critical in avoiding
the pitfalls of colonialism and paternalism that too often plague
international humanitarian aid (Spandler, 2020, 6).
Locals in Lesvos are distinctly aware of the potential dangers of
these power dynamics, with one of our interview participants
explicitly referring to NGOs as “colonizers” (Ilhias, man 40 years.,
2016)1. A skepticism towards “the neocolonial attitude of
international humanitarian actors” (Rozakou, 2017, 102) is
confirmed by other ethnographic studies of Lesvos. While
there is a rich literature connecting this skepticism to group
identity and the development of the refugee crisis in Greece,
existing research primarily treats solidarity as a characteristic of
local initiatives and traces the historical and linguistic significance
of solidarity in Greek culture to its current humanitarian
expressions (Rozakou, 2016b; Arampatzi, 2017; Serntedakis,
2017). In distinguishing between local and global solidarity,
this paper represents an important step towards addressing the
“conceptual imprecision . . . reproduced by the coexistence of the
concepts ‘solidarity’ and ‘humanitarianism’ in the same
conversations” (Theodossopoulos, 2016, 170).
The emphasis on incorporating global solidarity into the
ongoing discussion of humanitarian aid and crisis
management in Lesvos, is connected to our choice of the term
CIGS. While other treatments of solidarity with refugees have
used terms such as citizens’ initiatives (Rozakou, 2016b, 81),
solidarity initiatives (Daskalaki and Kokkinidis, 2017, 1305), and
refugee solidarity movements (Oikonomakis, 2018, 66) to
describe various egalitarian, ad hoc, efforts to offer material or
relational support—a designation that includes global solidarity
highlights a crucial, relational orientation towards the mediation
of distance between one’s established in-groups and marginalized
1All names of interview participants used in this paper are fictive.
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out-groups. We argue that if the concept of global solidarity is
to provide insights into the dynamics of localization and
empowerment, the social and structural relations of the
agents involved must be recognized. Differentiating between
the local and the global in terms of group membership serves as
a reminder that, even when working together in solidarity, the
motivations and obligations of outsiders providing aid both
stem from and generate different normative commitments
than those of locals.
Expanding on this distinction, section two begins by
outlining and contrasting the accounts of the motivation of
global solidarity offered by Richard Rorty and Avery Kolers.
While an exhaustive review of the relevant philosophical
literature on global solidarity is beyond the scope of this
paper, these two theories provide clear examples of
positions at opposing sides of the sentimentalist-rationalist
spectrum of motivation. The emphasis of motivation in
accounting for global solidarity is then problematized by an
interpretation of the work of Amanda Taylor. Using the
theoretical framework developed in section two, sections
three and four explore the contextual tensions and
intergroup dynamics observed during field work in Lesvos.
Section five synthesizes critical reflections from the previous
sections and suggests a productive interplay between global
solidarity and the localization of humanitarian aid, that we
argue renders the two compatible.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
If the role of CIGS is to be meaningfully discussed in terms of
calling for—or practically representing—a novel sense of
global solidarity, conceptual clarity will be crucial. Existing
conceptualizations of global solidarity generally fall into one of
two camps, which have been referred to as sentimentalist and
rationalist (Sandelind and Ulaş, 2020, 564; Lenard et al., 2010,
101). The distinction between a relational ethics of care on the
one hand, and rational political engagement on the other, is
common to analyses of solidarity and humanitarianism alike
(Bauder and Juffs, 2020, 10). While the terminology varies
from theory to theory, we argue that both sentimentalist and
rationalist approaches are compatible with the distinction we
have offered between local and global solidarities. A perennial
problem for both sentimentalists and rationalists, which is
especially relevant to humanitarian crises, concerns the
difficulties of motivating global solidarity with distant
others (Lenard, 2010; Chouliaraki, 2013; Gould, 2020).
Upon hearing that a neighbor is suddenly without a place
to stay, it may feel natural to provide support even at the
expense of one’s own comfort and lifestyle. However, upon
hearing that there are refugees without shelter in another
country, involvement may not come as naturally and one’s
role may not be as immediately clear. We turn now to examples
of sentimentalist and rationalist treatments of motivating
global solidarity, before considering whether or not the very
emphasis of motivation is problematic when balancing global
solidarity and the localization of humanitarian aid.
Richard Rorty, Ethnocentrism, and
Sentimental Education
Sentimentalist approaches to the challenge of motivating global
solidarity emphasize the potential for particular individuals or
communities to be inspired to offer support to particular distant
others in specific contexts. Affective elements are often
underlined, describing the global component of global
solidarity as a matter of increasing inclusivity (Rorty, 1989),
extending social empathy (Gould, 2007), or broadening the
redistribution of relational goods (Straehle, 2020). Particular
local commitments based on fellow feeling and sentimentality
are seen as potentially unproblematic, or even as the best available
tools to facilitate moral progress towards a global solidarity that is
grounded in care and trust (Baier, 1991).
The work of Richard Rorty offers one of the most influential
contributions to a sentimentalist conceptualization of global
solidarity. Rorty argues that moral progress towards greater
global solidarity is a matter of increasing ethnocentric
inclusivity (Rorty, 1991, 1:30). Rorty’s unconventional use of
the term ethnocentrism is an expression of his conviction that one
cannot climb outside of one’s own situated position to make an
agent-neutral or theory-neutral evaluation of any context. Being
ethnocentric in a Rortyan sense, means acknowledging that new
interpretations of one’s moral obligations must be weighed
against existing interpretations, rather than against whatever
might be assumed to provide a neutral background for an
impartial choice. Efforts towards ethnocentric inclusivity aim
to extend or shift existing local solidarities to distant, suffering
out-groups. On this view, an acute humanitarian crisis can be
interpreted as a moral reason to engage and support distant
others as one would if the crisis were causing harm to one’s local
in-groups.
Effectively motivating global solidarity, on a Rortyan account,
hinges upon the development of “the ability to see more andmore
traditional differences (of tribe, religion, race, customs, and the
like) as unimportant . . . the ability to think of people wildly
different from ourselves as included in the range of ‘us’” (1989,
192). Increasing this ability to dismiss the distance between “us”
and these “wildly different others,” relies on an understanding of
self-creation as redescription rather than transcendence. Rorty’s
proposal to develop attitudes of global solidarity through
ethnocentric, inclusive redescriptions suggests that motivating
actions in support of a distant refugee crisis is a matter of
describing the situations of those with proximity to the crisis
in ways that allow one to identify this distant problem as one’s
own. An ethnocentric approach to redescription favors an
openness to empathic “world-travelling” over static
commitments to all members of the species (Lugones, 1987).
Sandra Lee Bartky refers to this openness as a rejection of
attempts to achieve “a view from nowhere”, in favor of
attempts to gain “a view from somewhere different” (Bartky,
1998, 387).
Rorty refers to self-creation through attempts to sensitize
oneself to distant problems, and identify with distant others,
as a process of sentimental education (Rorty, 1998, 3:176).
Motivating global solidarity through sentimental education is a
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matter of increasing global sensitivity to narratives of suffering.
For Rorty, this sensitivity is most easily achieved through “the
continual refreshment and re-creation of the self, through
interaction with selves as unlike itself as possible” (1998, 3:
183). Thus, while the situated perspectives of the individuals
involved in global solidarity relations are unavoidable, and while
complete agent-neutrality or impartiality is unobtainable, there
remains an opportunity to “gain more critical leverage the more
we experience and expose ourselves to others’ standpoints”
(Thayer-Bacon, 2010, 10). This strategy parallels a conclusion
drawn from previous research into the motivations of CIGS,
namely that “for many their involvement must also be
understood as a project of self-construction and identity. The
helping of others contributes to the construction of self” (Haaland
and Wallevik, 2017, 206). A similar conclusion was reached
regarding Finnish citizens’ involvement in international
development projects (Malkki, 2015).
An interpretation of global solidarity as sentimental education
and self-creation is supported by the affective and personal
components of motivation shared in the following narrative
from a CIGS member in Lesvos:
“I’ve been kind of monitoring the situation with the
crisis and I’m quite passionate about it. I’m not an
activist at all, because I’m a bit more calmer and just
want everybody to be full of love and life to be honest.
(Laughter) And I don’t get caught up in politics . . . And
then I just realized . . . This is my opportunity to take a
bit of a career break.” (Crystal, woman 30 years., 2016)
Here we see identification with the refugee crisis described in
affective terms of passion and a desire to spread love and life,
rather than in terms of political activism. This narrative offers an
example of global solidarity inspired by sentiment, which offers
both transformative interactions with distant others and a
deviation from an established career path. Interestingly, this
woman’s previous career experience was connected to
humanitarian aid. When asked about the professionalizing
influence that she described her involvement having on the
initiative, she described this influence as unfortunate, saying:
“I didn’t want to tap into toomany of my previous skills.
Because it made me feel like I was doing something
from before.” (ibid.)
The transformative power of acting in global solidarity and the
appeal of self-creation through active and empathic identification
with others should not be underestimated as a motivator of
humanitarian aid.
In some instances, those motivated by a more “ethnocentric”
and sentimental approach are considered too individualistic,
engaged in something very different from solidarity
(Serntedakis, 2017, 91). Importantly, this potential criticism
should not be limited to international volunteers, as
Theodossopoulos connects “the empowering dimension of
solidarity” and “the emancipatory euphoria of their
participatory experience” to opportunities for local Greeks “to
escape temporarily from the paralyzing, disempowering effects of
austerity” by engaging refugees (2016, 176). This serves as a
reminder of the importance of conceptual clarity regarding global
solidarity and local empowerment. If global and local solidarities
are differentiated using group membership, the global solidarity
demonstrated by the citizens of Lesvos can be an integral part of
local empowerment. On the other hand, ethnocentric and
sentimentally motivated solidarity runs the risk of prioritizing
self-creation or personal transformation over the needs of the
supposed recipients of solidarity support and can depoliticize the
structural causes of humanitarian crises (Ticktin, 2014, 283).
From a Rortyan perspective, those who find personal and
emotional motivations problematic would do well to discard the
“opposition between self-interest and morality, an opposition
which makes it hard to realize that my pride in being a part of the
human rights culture is nomore external to myself thanmy desire
for financial or sexual success” (1998, 3:176). Here Rorty presents
moral obligation as made, rather than found. This would suggest,
unsatisfactorily for rationalists, that agents involved in global
solidarity projects such as CIGS are simply motivated by a desire
to be better people—and that both motivations and
interpretations of “better” stem from particular identities and
communities, rather than from a transcendental understanding
of rationality and obligation. Rejecting the opposition between
morality and self-interest means that fostering global solidarity,
or any other moral project, is not a matter of bypassing one’s own
desires and identity. Instead, global solidarity becomes a matter of
sentimental education—a process which cannot pretend to
exclude the self, and which aims for flexibility and sensitivity
rather than impartiality or finality.
Avery Kolers and Reason-Driven Solidarity
Rationalist approaches to motivating global solidarity are
skeptical of personal and particular motivations, which are
seen as a source of potential bias, instead emphasizing the
importance of impartial justice. Global solidarity is portrayed
as the duty of all human beings to provide aid to those suffering
injustices, and to address the structural problems that lead to
these injustices (Kolers, 2005; Scholz, 2008). Spandler observes
that, within the context of humanitarian aid, “rationalist
perspectives usually take for granted that there exists a
consensus on the fundamental purposes and principles of
humanitarian action” (2020, 6). In discussions of the ethics of
global solidarity this translates to an assumption that, at least
under ideal circumstances, there would be general agreement that
global solidarity represents a universal duty. The normative force
of this duty to engage in global solidarity is assumed to be a
compelling motivator in and of itself (Kolers, 2012, 1). Therefore,
from a rationalist perspective, motivating global solidarity is a
matter of overcoming individual bias and attaining clarity as to
what actions our universal duties entail.
Avery Kolers offers a rationalist account of global solidarity
that clearly distances itself from the sentimentalist acceptance of
the role of individualistic self-creation in motivation. He writes,
“. . .in solidarity one chooses sides for a reason that applies to
people in general, not just to those who are in a certain
relationship. I join in solidarity not because I think I ought to,
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but because I think one ought to” (Kolers, 2016, 73). Kolers
presents his version of global solidarity as “reason-driven political
action on others’ terms” (Kolers, 2016, 57). Reason-driven
solidarity is presented as an alternative to both individualism,
which motivates one to join in solidarity with those that share
one’s own interests and values, and loyalty solidarity, which
motivates action based on existing commitments to a certain
group. In short, Kolers argues that solidarity should be reason-
driven in order to counteract the tendency to side with those one
agrees with and those one has already formed relationships with.
When Kolers describes the political action motivated by global
solidarity as “on others’ terms”, he has specific others in
mind—those picked out by agent-neutral reasons. He claims
that the only defensible form of solidarity is progressive
solidarity, which is defined as reason-driven solidarity that
commits one to join the side of the group that is “least-well
off in a given social structure” (2005, 157). On this rationalist
account, global solidarity is an obligation to use agent-neutral
criteria that provide the motivational resources to join forces with
distant out-groups in need of aid, thereby overcoming biases that
stem from personal interests, moral intuitions, and existing
loyalties. The value of global solidarity thereby lies in
motivating support for the least well-off, regardless of whether
or not one agrees with their goals or strategies.
On this structural view, conclusions made by outsiders
motivated by global solidarity—whom Kolers refers to as
“joiners”—that the tactics of the least well-off are unwise or
even morally problematic, are based on moral intuitions that are
products of the current status quo. In other words, efforts towards
bottom-up empowerment cannot be productively evaluated using
the moral intuitions of those at the top of existing social
hierarchies. Here Kolers offers an interesting distinction
between “acting in behalf of another and acting on their
behalf. Whereas the former is the attempt to benefit them, the
latter is the attempt to do what they would do in the situation”
(2016, 22). Acting in behalf of others, attempting to improve the
standing of suffering groups by outside standards, may address
the outcomes of structural inequities but fails to meaningfully
shift the status quo. Kolers argues that only acting on behalf of
others qualifies as joining in global solidarity—as this involves
acknowledging and deferring to the views of those disempowered
by the existing social order.
Applied to the field of humanitarian aid, Kolers’ rationalist
approach to global solidarity presents some advantages. The
structural focus and insistence on acting on others’ terms
serve as a reminder of the power dynamics between the
groups involved in humanitarian crises. Connecting specifically
to the localization of aid, if more ownership over crisis
management is to be transferred to those with proximity to a
crisis, this will inevitably require agents with less proximity to give
up certain aspects of ownership. This will call for a willingness on
the parts of outsiders to provide aid on others’ terms—to
recognize the strategies of those who think “wildly differently”
as viable solutions to humanitarian problems. This interpretation
of Kolers’ rationalist approach to global solidarity connects to the
localization of humanitarian aid insofar as it suggests that
coordination efforts should grant a form of epistemic privilege
to locals in recognition of the lack of collective hermeneutical
resources that might make their tactics feel intuitive to outsiders.
In other words, to the extent that those with proximity to a crisis
and the “least well-off” can be assumed to overlap, reason-driven
solidarity suggests that the viability of aid strategies should be
increasingly evaluated on the grounds of proximity to the crisis and
less on the grounds of compatibility with dominant global values
and moral intuitions.
However, the idea of using reason-driven solidarity to avoid
either widespread hegemony or individual bias encounters
practical problems. The most obvious is that suggesting the
use of agent-neutral criteria that determine who is “least well-
off” in a given humanitarian crisis, assumes that there will be a
general consensus as to who is “least well-off”. Rather than
moving past the particularities of Rortyan ethnocentrism with
any finality, the proposed use of reason-driven solidarity
simply raises the practical challenge of contextually defining
proximity by one level of abstraction. In other words,
returning to the example of Lesvos, a theoretical
rationalization of motivation offers no objective criteria for
determining how to defer to the multiple groups with
legitimate claims to proximity to the crisis.
This can be connected to Spandler’s comment about
rationalist perspectives on humanitarian aid assuming the
existence of consensus. Even in the unlikely case that there
was a consensus among all aid agents that, for example, the
Syrian refugees constituted the least well-off group, and there was
a consensus among all Syrian refugees as to how to coordinate
crisis relief—both the attempted empowerment of that group and
any interpretation of their strategies would be colored by
individual and group bias. An assumption of underlying
consensus also increases the risk of treating diverse groups as
homogenous. This is not to suggest that rationalist arguments
about appropriate motivations of global solidarity cannot inspire
praiseworthy attempts to avoid the potentially colonizing impacts
of outside aid. It is instead an argument that rationalist
approaches to global solidarity do not remove individual or
group bias from the interpretations, applications, or
motivations of global solidarity by including “reason-driven”
or “on other’s terms” in their theoretical formulations.
The contrast offered between Rorty and Kolers suggests that
one set of tensions between sentimentalist and rationalist
accounts rests upon the possibility and desirability of
motivating global solidarity using neutral and impartial
criteria. The differences between these accounts also parallel
Rozakou’s distinction between traditional, professionalized
volunteerism and an emerging Greek alternative approach to
volunteerism, which she describes as “a field of fluid and open
sociality” (2016a, 95). Several studies of the Greek context
describe this alternative volunteerism as a rejection of the
political in favor of the social (Rozakou, 2016a, 82;
Serntedakis, 2017, 84–85). This leads Serntedakis to
conclude that egalitarian, anti-hierarchical attitudes and an
aversion to top-down charity and philanthropy among
volunteers in Greece, have led to an understanding of
solidarity as “more about transforming social relations than
trying to transform political systems” (2017, 95).
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It would therefore appear that CIGS and other informal
volunteer groups in Lesvos are more aligned with a
sentimental, affective, and relational view of the goals of
solidarity. Remembering that Kolers defines global solidarity as
political action on others’ terms and highlights the need to attend
to structural factors with impartiality, his rationalist view appears
to be more in line with traditional volunteerism and established
humanitarianism. With this tension in mind, we move now to
Taylor’s treatment of global solidarity, which offers additional
conceptual resources for understanding when solidarity should
aim to transform social relationships and when it should aim to
support political resistance.
Amanda Taylor and the Unidirectionality of
Global Solidarity
While rationalists such as Kolers conceptualize the global element
in global solidarity as a matter of subordinating one’s local
loyalties to agent-neutral evaluations of structural inequities,
sentimentalists such as Rorty see this global element of
solidarity as a matter of expanding or adjusting one’s attitudes
about what constitutes group membership—so as to make one’s
loyalties as inclusive and flexible as possible. While Kolers hopes
to cultivate an agent-neutral obligation towards those it might not
come naturally to join forces with, Rorty hopes to motivate the
empathic inclusion of as many groups as possible in an
ethnocentric understanding of “one of us”. Both theories,
despite their numerous and significant differences, can be read
as advocating concepts of global solidarity that focus on
motivating what we will refer to here as “siding unnaturally”.
A sense that one is on the same side as a suffering neighbor
that one has developed a sense of local solidarity with, will come
naturally for many. Actively siding with distant refugees, seems
not to come as naturally, suggesting that global solidarity and
siding unnaturally represent more demanding forms of
motivation. Versions of global solidarity that focus on siding
unnaturally present moral progress towards greater solidarity as
an increased ability to move from, or past, local commitments to
global commitments. Understanding the value of global solidarity
through its ability to facilitate siding unnaturally, whether out of a
sense of moral duty or due to a particular and personal
commitment, is highly relevant in connecting global solidarity
to the localization of humanitarian aid. The goal of siding
unnaturally portrays the primary value of global solidarity as a
means of motivating the involvement of those who are not in
close proximity to humanitarian emergencies. While global
attention and contributions are key in addressing
humanitarian crises, there is a potential conflict between
efforts to mobilize global involvement and efforts to localize
ownership of crisis management.
Conceptions of global solidarity as siding unnaturally can be
problematized by the work of Amanda Taylor, who distinguishes
between robust solidarity and expressional solidarity (2015, 129).
As with the local/global distinction offered in this paper, one key
feature differentiating Taylor’s two types of solidarity is group
membership. Robust solidarity exists between members of an
established group acting together in pursuit of joint interests that
they cannot realize individually. The robust form of solidarity
requires reciprocal empathy, mutual recognition among group
members, and a shared sense of trust. Taylor describes
expressional solidarity as support that comes from those
outside the robust solidary group. When solidarity is
expressional, elements such as identification, trust, and
empathy are unidirectional and sometimes primarily
“motivated to ensure recent events get attention in the West”
(Taylor, 2015, 132).
Although demonstrations of expressional solidarity might
potentially set one on a path towards membership in a group
that shares robust solidarity, Taylor argues convincingly that the
robust solidarity between insiders is a matter of acting on mutual
obligations and positive duties, while the expressional solidarity
engaged in by outsiders is a matter of acting on motivation. In
other words, when a group is affected by a crisis, the robust
solidarity that exists within the affected group generates
obligations or responsibilities to protect the group’s interests
and well-being. Non-members may experience expressional
solidarity with the out-group in crisis, and this may motivate
these non-members to work to protect that out-group’s interests
and well-being. However, the two forms of solidarity do not have
the same normative composition (2015, 28).
While interests may be shared between those displaying
expressional solidarity and those engaged in robust solidarity,
these are characterized as parallel interests rather than joint
interests. Taylor argues that solidarity is unique in that it
“involves adopting the group’s interest as one’s own and
linking the achievement of such interests with one’s own well-
being” (2015, 133). Importantly, this process of making a group’s
interests integral to one’s sense of self is compatible with both
expressional and robust solidarity—with having either parallel or
joint interests. The difference between the two hinges on the
unidirectional or multi-directional nature of the investment.
Through global solidarity one can come to identify the
struggle of a distant out-group as one’s own. When this
identification with the group in crisis is unidirectional,
meaning one comes to identify an out-group’s interests as
deeply connected to one’s own well-being, solidarity is
expressional. Only when there is multidirectional
identification, meaning one is also identified by the group as
included in the obligations generated by group-membership, does
solidarity qualify as robust2.
There is an important sense in which both the rationalist
and sentimentalist versions of global solidarity as siding
unnaturally espoused by Kolers and Rorty suggest that
global commitments to distant out-groups embody the
more demanding version of solidarity. From the perspective
of generating motivation, they may be right. However, we read
Taylor’s distinction as suggesting that the obligations incurred
2Our use of Taylor’s distinction between robust solidarity and expressional
solidarity emphasizes her treatment of identification and joint interests in order
to highlight parallels to our own distinction between local solidarity and global
solidarity. Taylor’s original article places a greater emphasis on mutual trust and a
disposition to empathy than is expressed here.
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upon existing members of a solidary in-group are in fact more
demanding and carry a stronger normative force than the
efforts of out-groups to express, what we refer to as, global
solidarity. This claim is not intended to minimize the
demanding nature of engaging in global solidarity. It is
instead intended as a warning against assumptions that the
challenging task of motivating involvement with distant out-
groups and the intensity of encounters that make the crises of
others one’s own, warrant a sense of what we might call
reciprocal or robust ownership of the crisis on par with that
of the groups most directly affected.
The reciprocity and multi-directional identification that
Taylor describes in robust solidarity are arguably not
present, or at least not necessary, in international
humanitarian aid (Gould, 2007, 157). It is incumbent upon
those motivated by global solidarity to consider that, as
“expressional solidarity is largely unidirectional, then there
is a danger that when I express solidarity with you, I project my
own vision of you into the solidaristic relationship, and thus
my solidarity is not with you as you, but with you as my idea of
you” (Woods, 2019, 151). This potential for projection can be
combined with Taylor’s distinction between joint interests and
parallel interests to problematize conceptions of global
solidarity that emphasize the motivation of siding
unnaturally. Kolers’ arguments for “joining” in global
solidarity and Rorty’s call to think of the members of
suffering out-groups as included in our sense of “one of
us”, carry with them a serious colonizing potential if not
accompanied by a thorough consideration of whether or not
the groups with which global solidarity is being expressed are
interested in outsiders “joining” or becoming “one of them” in
a robust sense.
Taylor’s distinction can be equally useful when applied to
international efforts to take the strategies of those with various
forms of proximity to a humanitarian crisis seriously. While
global solidarity is highly demanding, it is often unidirectional
and may represent parallel interests rather than
multidirectional or robust obligations towards joint
interests. Specifically, in the context of Lesvos, Rozakou has
observed that the dominant understanding of solidarity among
volunteers “seeks to overcome the limitations and the perils
deriving from one-way offers” (2016b, 189). We argue that
overzealous efforts on the parts of international actors to turn
their global solidarity into robust solidarity may in fact have a
disempowering effect on those groups most affected by crises.
This underlines the importance of consciously keeping the
global solidarity of international aid efforts at the level of
expressional solidarity. Distinguishing between the local and
global forms of solidarity, and between robust and
expressional commitments, can offer insights into the
potential coordination of groups with different senses of
proximity to humanitarian crises. As suggested earlier, this
represents a major challenge in contextualizing and practically
implementing the localization of humanitarian aid. Later
discussion of this conceptualization will draw on illustrative
examples from our own fieldwork in Lesvos, to which we
now turn.
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
This paper is based on data collected on and in Lesvos between
2015 and 2019. Our empirical data consist of qualitative
interviews, observations, and participant observations and are
thus grounded in ethnography. Prior to our first round of
fieldwork in 2016, we followed the unfolding crisis in Lesvos
through mainstream news and social media. Here we focused on
how CIGS emerged as a response to the influx of refugees to the
island. It was our previous research on CIGS in a development
context (Haaland and Wallevik, 2017) that spurred an interest in
the initiatives that popped up in Lesvos. These initiatives—that
quickly organized to respond to various aspects of the crisis in
Lesvos—were followed online with a particular emphasis on their
activities, especially their efforts to help during the peak of the
crisis. The material collected online provided us with an initial
overview of the types of engagement that emerged in Lesvos
during 2015. At the same time, an initial mapping of CIGS in
Norway showed that out of 350 initiatives that were portrayed in
local newspaper articles from 2000 to 2016, 83 were refugee
related, with ties to Greece and Lesvos. Since 2015, the number of
Norwegian aid initiatives that targets refugees, including those in
Lesvos, has continued to grow (Fylkesnes et al. forthcoming). This
data formed a backdrop for our further data collection in the field,
as some of the initiatives were followed up and further
interviewed during our various field stays.
Our on-site fieldwork in Lesvos started in 2016. During five
shorter field stays over the years 2016–2019 we conducted
interviews with founders and members of initiatives that
worked with the refugee crisis. To capture the rapid changes
and the ways initiatives responded to change over time, several
informants have been interviewed multiple times. We have also
engaged in numerous discussions with representatives of the local
government who had established a local response team.
Additionally, we have interviewed representatives from both
UNHCR and larger NGOs to contextualize the role of CIGS
within the broader network of crisis response in Lesvos. Both
informal and formal interviews were also conducted with
residents in Lesvos, especially those involved in tourism, an
industry which has been impacted by the refugee situation.
This provided insight into everyday practices, local discourses,
and perceptions of the situation amongst local people. As such, it
contributed to further contextualizing the understanding and
handling of crisis. We also visited the three refugee camps on the
Island: Lesvos Solidarity, Kara Tepe, and Moria. The latter refers
to the camp located near the village of Moria prior to the fire in
2020. These visits provided opportunities to observe the roles
CIGS assume within the camps, and to speak with camp
managers, volunteers, and refugees.
During our first stay we travelled around the island and
observed responses to the large numbers of refugees arriving
at the shores of Northern Lesvos, walking across the island to get
to Mytilini, and attempting further travel to mainland Greece.
Moving across the island as part of our field work has enabled
continuous informal conversations with people who had been
involved in voluntary work. Our travels facilitated participant
observations which were recorded in field notebooks. Several
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residents became gatekeepers who further facilitated access to the
local communities we encountered. We quickly discovered that
almost every one of our Greek informants had been involved in
early efforts to prepare food, provide transport, or contribute in
some way to CIGS. However, both the positive sentiments
towards refugees and the local optimism about the viability of
humanitarian aid deteriorated amongst many of our informants
as the crisis continued. Our numerous field trips allowed us to
observe the evolutions of various narratives of crisis, which
reflected developments in the local, political, and economic
context.
In May 2017, we participated in the “Mini Lesvos
dialogues”–meetings set up to enable a variety of actors
involved in the crisis to discuss their experiences and
strategies. The meetings allowed for further recruitment of
informants for our research. We returned for a second
dialogue session in 2019. These two dialogue meetings enabled
us to explore both cooperation and tensions between the actors
involved, all of whom experienced and engaged with the crisis
from different perspectives. Several shorter field visits to the
island enabled us to, over time, follow CIGS and other actors,
observing both changes and continuities in their work. In total,
we have interviewed 15 CIGS owners who have been working in
Lesvos both prior to and during the crisis. In addition, we
conducted interviews with members of local government,
NGO representatives, and employees from each of the three
refugee camps mentioned above. Snowball sampling guided
our selection of interviewees. The interview data has been
transcribed and anonymized. All names used in the article are
thus fictive names.
During the collection and analysis of data, the type of work
that various CIGS engaged in and the ways they coordinated with,
resisted, or otherwise related to the other actors involved was
emphasized. This approach is inspired by Institutional
Ethnography (Smith, 2005) and explores how the ruling
relations, efforts, and discourses of other actors govern CIGS
in their activities. Our research on CIGS therefore included
investigating the local communities they engage, whether
Greek citizens or refugee populations, as well as other actors
such as NGOs, the local and central governments, and UNHCR.
As such, we have been concerned with howCIGS and other actors
present and perceive themselves vis-à-vis other actors, as well as
how they perceive and talk about other aid actors and the refugee
situation on the island and beyond. Consequently, attention is
paid to the overarching context and the ruling relations, such as
local and national policies and humanitarian discourse.
As CIGS are not universally considered to be legitimate actors
within development and humanitarian assistance, much of what
they do remains invisible to the other actors. A standpoint within
CIGS and their everyday work illuminates how and to what extent
they are guided by the social relations they take part in, both
locally and trans-locally, i.e., what relations and ruling relations
are guiding their work (Smith, 2005). Emphasis on their activities
enables us to understand their work as socially coordinated in
response to crisis. Insights into CIGS’ perceptions of themselves
and others contributes to research on CIGS and other actors
involved in networked crisis management.
LOCAL COORDINATION AND GLOBAL
ATTENTION
It is important to differentiate between the CIGS operating in a
crisis context, such as Lesvos, and those operating in a
development context. Development-oriented CIGS generally
work informally and “under the radar” of local authorities,
often enjoying a degree of freedom from local bureaucracies,
policies, and guidelines (Haaland and Wallevik, 2017). Rather
than acting as part of a coordinated development aid response,
these CIGS focus on the individual needs of particular
communities. In contrast, CIGS that respond to acute
humanitarian crises are often monitored and integrated into
overarching crisis management strategies. In Lesvos, for
example, international CIGS are registered as soon as they
arrive (Haaland and Wallevik, 2019). This registration has
been necessary to monitor the multitude of actors that have
been involved over the course of the crisis.
The initial response fell to the locals who were, fortunately,
accustomed to the arrival of refugees. They were, however,
unequipped to handle the thousands of refugees that arrived
unexpectedly in 2015, the majority of whom were fleeing the
conflict in Syria. As part of the initial response, members of the
tourism industry made their premises available as refugee shelters
while other islanders arranged transport and gathered food and
clothes. Locals also helped boats ashore, provided blankets, and
constructed temporary shelters (Guribye and Mydland, 2018).
Numerous international volunteers and CIGS, responding to the
crisis depicted in both mainstream and social media, worked
alongside the locals. Many of these CIGS established working
relationships with local organizations and the local government,
functioning as organized parts of a local response that laid the
foundation for the coordinated crisis management that developed
when UNHCR and larger international NGOs arrived in 2016.
Since the arrival of the larger international actors, a
coordinated effort, led by UNHCR and the local government,
has incorporated several of the smaller CIGS. The CIGS operating
outside this coordinated effort run their activities parallel to the
crisis management team, often advocating alternative strategies
(Haaland and Wallevik, 2019). Adding to the complexity of the
situation, the refugee camps in Lesvos are not run by a single
centralized body. Moria, the largest refugee camp on the island, is
run by the central Greek authorities, while the smaller camp of
Kara Tepe is run by local authorities. While the local government
points to Kara Tepe as a showcase of Greek hospitality, they argue
strongly against the establishment of more permanent refugee
accommodations in Lesvos.
Rather than accommodating refugees on the island, the local
government argues that the demands of the crisis should be
increasingly shared by mainland Greece and the EU. This
argument represents the islanders’ eagerness to restore
normality and tourism, which is a major source of local
income. While some tourist businesses, particularly those
located near the Island capital, are able to generate revenue
from NGO workers, CIGS, and volunteers, others have seen
their incomes radically reduced. Many locals explicitly blame
the refugees for the lack of tourism and increasingly refer to
Frontiers in Political Science | www.frontiersin.org July 2021 | Volume 3 | Article 6909078
Shults et al. Localizing Global Solidarity in Lesvos
refugees as migrants, an expression of their frustration with the
longevity of the situation.
Many of the large NGOs eventually left, leaving a growing role
for the CIGS that have remained on the island. These initiatives
are taking care of everyday needs both inside and outside formal
and informal camps, while also making efforts to direct global
attention to the continued humanitarian crisis. A solution to the
crisis seems distant and refugees and islanders alike are tired.
Tensions regarding how to live with, engage in, and possibly solve
the situation are omnipresent. The tensions observed during our
fieldwork can be categorized into two sets of contested interests,
which we describe as “coordination of local crisis management”
and “global attention”.
Turning first to the coordination of local crisis management,
one continued attempt can be seen in the weekly coordination
meetings run by UNHCR, in dialogue with the local
government. At these meetings, actors involved in various
forms of crisis response offer updates on their activities and
discuss future strategies. Over the years we have seen parallel
efforts towards coordination develop amongst CIGS, but we
have also heard reports of competition between aid actors. Many
CIGS are critical towards the local government and the
UNHCR, and therefore purposefully work outside of the
larger coordination efforts. Some experience the coordination
mechanisms imposed by more established humanitarian aid
agents as inflexible and lacking sensitivity to the local
community:
“I mean, the UNHCR, they came at the beginning. It
was like ‘We know everything. We speak English, only
English, in all coordination meetings.’ This is not
acceptable. And they are wondering why, why the
authorities are not here, why hospital is not here.
You are in Greece! Speak the language! Or make the
translation—I know it takes time. But this is also a
symbol. I mean, you give the signal that you don’t
respect” (Claire, woman 50 years, 2017).
Included in the sharp criticism of the perceived colonizing
presence of UNHCR, were frustrations with the way UNHCR
took control over projects that were being carried out by local
organizations and CIGS in the early months of the crisis. This
structural transition created lasting tensions between the larger
organizations, on the one side, and the smaller initiatives and
local population on the other. The disappointment with being
unceremoniously pushed aside upon the arrival of established
organizations was bolstered by a skepticism towards the resource
flows of these larger actors:
“I’mnot sure about the UNHCR as an organization. But
they are a big money-making machine. They spend a lot
on advertising. That grieves me” (Patty, woman
50 years, 2017)
The concern with the use of funds voiced by CIGS
members was also widespread among citizens of Lesvos.
However, this local skepticism was also directed towards
NGOs, CIGS, and international volunteers who were
perceived as driven by self-interest or as more invested in
the refugees than in finding permanent solutions that would
benefit local communities. The fact that both formal and
informal international aid agents will eventually move on
can lead to a sense of solidarity that exists in transition
(Oikonomakis, 2018, 68). The temporary presence of
outsiders is all the more reason to emphasize local
ownership of crisis management and to keep global
solidarity at an expressional level.
Local interview participants suggested that the government
should manage the refugee situation despite the necessity of
foreign contributions. They argue that NGOs and other
international actors serve an inappropriate function, as
substitutes for the government:
“That should not happen. NGOs should be something
complementary and not a substitute. We always see
NGOs drawing money from the natives, from the
government, from the EU, and doing its jobs. But we
believe it is a government’s job, it is the citizens’ job, to
be there . . . This way, we believe that the very fact of
democracy is being undermined. Right now, the money
from the EU was given to NGOs. The ministry asked
Save the Children for funds, to use for education. That is
a degradation. Governments asking NGOs. Who
controls the NGOs? Of course, who controls the
government? And who trusts the government?”
(Ilhias, man 40 years, 2016).
In this example, frustrations point to the complicated and
overlapping roles played by a wide range of organizations in the
current attempts to coordinate crisis management. Some of these
frustrations are directed at the established crisis management
team, which is comprised of local government, UNHCR, NGOs,
and selected CIGS. However, despite the call for a larger role for
government, there is also an unmistakable suggestion that the
government is not trustworthy. This seems to suggest that,
ideally, the government should be working more with local
citizens and less with the international NGO establishment.
From this perspective, the localization of humanitarian aid
might offer coordination solutions and restore local faith in
the government.
However, from the perspective of the local government, the
main impediments to efficient coordination are the
uncooperative CIGS and international volunteers that resist
the coordination efforts of the established crisis management
team:
“But these are doing more harm than good. Because
they are not coordinated. It’s no use to have people
distributing food when you need people welcoming
boats, for example” (Marcus, man 30 years, 2016)
“People lacking experience come in and set up a tent
and do their thing; this is not contributing to the overall
management of the crisis.” (ibid)
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Specifically, parallel projects that aim to achieve the same ends
as local government projects, but refuse to join in coordinated
efforts, are seen as individualistic troublemakers rather than
competent contributors:
“Why not helping the overall situation? Why? Because
they want to do something of their own. Because they
do not believe in the coordination mechanism. Because
they do not trust UNHCR.” (ibid)
These misgivings are echoed by UNHCR and other larger
organizations, who express concerns about a lack of
professionalism in the CIGS involved in crisis relief. Larger,
specialized organizations bring professionals to cater to
specific needs that they have a degree of familiarity with. They
question the ability of well-intentioned amateurs to, for example,
provide care for traumatized, refugee children:
“You want to help children, but what do you know
about child development? Cultural sensitivity? Or are
you just a person who thinks ‘I want to help’?” (Themis,
Man 35 years, 2016)
Within the UNHCR’s skepticism towards CIGS’ lack of
experience is an implicit critique of the instability generated
by cooperation between local government and CIGS. In the
management of Kara Tepe, for instance, the local government
relies heavily on services from smaller, recently founded
initiatives. When CIGS uncritically accept assignments,
failing to reflect on the sustainability of the privately
generated funds they depend on to continue their work, this
can introduce instability into the core operations of the camps.
Interestingly, criticisms regarding the abilities of certain types
of aid agents to relieve the crisis in Lesvos appear to cut both ways.
On the one hand, UNHCR criticizes CIGS for lacking the
professionalism and experience to deal with a humanitarian
crisis. At least some CIGS are described as doing more harm
than good due to their resistance towards an overarching
“coordination mechanism”. On the other hand, the CIGS
criticize the UNHCR for relying on professionalism and
outside experience too such an extent that they become
dispassionate and insufficiently attuned to cooperative
relations that were developed before the arrival of the
larger organizations. We interpret the resistance of CIGS
as a critique of existing coordination mechanisms, rather
than a resistance of coordination as such. The resistance
stems from both concerns that funds are not being spent
appropriately and a perceived lack of respect for locals and
small-scale aid operations. These tensions demonstrate a
clear absence of a shared understanding of joint interests
among the actors attempting to provide aid to refugees and
the citizens of Lesvos.
Turning to the second contested interest, “global attention,”
we have observed that many locals feel at cross-purposes with
humanitarian aid agents. The residents of Lesvos struggle with
the economic impacts of the refugee situation while
simultaneously seeing large amounts of resources being
mobilized in attempts to provide aid. Despite global
attention and contributions, the challenges of the locals
remain. Over the course of our fieldwork, we witnessed a
growing perception of outsiders as motivated by financial
self-interest or a desire to feel good about themselves,
rather than a desire to provide meaningful aid:
“. . .they only care about what they feel. They want to
feel pleased that they helped someone.” (Alexandros,
man 40 years, 2016)
With active members of the local community going so far as to
say, for example:
“Refugees are not the problem, but volunteers are.”
(Ilhas, man, 40 years, 2017)
Long term volunteers are familiar with such attitudes and find
them burdensome. As one volunteer expressed:
“In my town . . . (i.e. where the interview participant
volunteers) I was told to go home . . . That I was making
too much money. That’s why I have come” (Margareth,
woman, 25 yrs, 2017).
If international support is perceived as corrupt or inefficient,
this naturally affects the desirability of directing further global
attention towards the situation in Lesvos. An additional tension
can be seen between outsiders who are interested in portraying a
crisis to generate awareness or donations, and locals who are
interested in portraying a sense of normality. CIGS, volunteers,
and representatives of international NGOs have scaled up their
presentations of the Lesvos crisis, in the absence of mainstream
media attention. These presentations are interpreted by some
locals as maintaining the crisis and as preventing a revival of the
tourist industry, as seen in the following comments from a local
businessperson:
“At the moment there is a big lack of marketing that
Lesvos is not suffering, in a way, with any bad
conditions of refugee crisis. So, people (tourists) do
not know to arrive back.” (Stavros, man, 50 years, 2016)
Later adding:
“I need to be persuaded that the NGOs are going to
solve my problem and not maintain it. The NGOs they
were maintaining the problem . . . competing
themselves, who is going to save more people so they
can get approved more grants. The Facebook pages and
everything were full of photos: ‘We saved these guys.
We saved these guys. Please help us. Send us money’.
Whatever. It happened. It happened on Facebook and
everybody can see it.” (ibid)
These comments illustrate a clear sense in which generating
global attention on outsiders’ terms may be preventing groups
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with proximity to the crisis from reestablishing themselves.
Media representation of the refugee situation offers a striking
example of Taylor’s point that unidirectional, expressional
attempts at global solidarity can prioritize the attention of the
West over the need to rebuild local communities.
Competing interests concerning the international
representation of Lesvos have complicated the coordinating
role of the local government, which is positioned between an
upward accountability to the national government and the EU
and a downward accountability to local citizens (Williams, 2010).
CIGS have also experienced the impacts of these tensions between
those arguing for a revival of the tourism sector and those
attending to the needs of refugees. While some CIGS have
simply given up due to negative feedback, others have
distanced themselves from the established aid machinery and
carefully communicated to the locals that they are not NGOs.
One organization hung a sign over their office announcing this,
which speaks to the intensity of local frustration with aspects of
the international response. This can be interpreted as part of the
resistance towards the professionalization of volunteerism and
aid that Rozakou describes as emerging in Greece (2016a, 95), and
as a need to distinguish solidarity from charity and established
humanitarianism.
Alongside the closure of some initiatives, new initiatives have
emerged. Some have been started by refugees working within the
camps, while others have been started by former refugees hoping
to meet the needs of both current refugees and islanders living
with the impacts of the crisis. Some of these refugee-run
initiatives receive international funding and attention, which
may offer a compromise between representations of crisis and
representations of cooperation and progress towards normalcy.
However, reestablishing positive perceptions of refugees among
the locals is no easy task. Conservative political groups have
thrived on anti-refugee attitudes in the local population. The
prospect of refugees being offered local jobs, being enrolled in
local schools, or finding permanent housing is often met with
resistance.
In summary, we observed increasing suspicion from locals
towards refugees and outside aid, as well as tensions between aid
agents regarding each other’s respective competencies in
navigating the situation in Lesvos. These issues center around
coordination, motivation, the use of funds, and representations of
the situation in Lesvos. Having looked at empirical examples of
competing interests that arise in both coordinating local crisis
management and representing the need for global involvement,
we can return to the attempt to balance the appeal of increased
localization of aid and the appeal of increased global solidarity.
A SUPPORTING ROLE: PROXIMITY
WITHOUT OWNERSHIP
The increase in global solidarity that CIGS appear to be calling for
by resisting established coordination mechanisms has two
components, which mirror the tensions mentioned in the
previous section. First, there is a call for more global attention
and action, which we have interpreted as potentially problematic
if not connected to the competing interests of those with
proximity to the crisis. Second, the act of engaging a
humanitarian crisis at a more horizontal, empathic, and
relational level—rather than joining with larger, more
established aid agencies—suggests that the perceived gaps in
the international response include a failure to offer personal
encounters that meet refugees and locals as individuals, rather
than cogs in a machine.
Turning first to the idea of an increase in global solidarity as a call
for more international responsibility, representation must play a key
role. We have presented the tension in Lesvos between an interest in
representing a crisis to motivate or finance outside involvement and
an interest in representing normality to revive the local economy.
Taylor’s claim that some cases of expressional solidarity focus on
getting the attention of the West, could be interpreted as suggesting
that the dissemination of narratives of suffering to motivate global
solidarity fails to account for the conflicting interests of affected, local
communities. Kolers would describe these attempts to motivate
global attention as acting in behalf of the locals, and thus as not
qualifying as global solidarity at all.
In one sense, this tension could be addressed through a
localization of aid, in which local communities were given more
ownership over the process of globally representing humanitarian
crises and crisis management. This acknowledges the unavoidable
global element of humanitarian aid, namely the recruitment of
outside resources, and localizes the ownership of this process in a
way that recognizes the interests of those affected by the crisis. This
would amount to a localization of the call for global solidarity. Of
course, at the level of practice, there are conflicting interests between
and within groups with legitimate claims of proximity to the crisis,
and there would be no way to control the totality of
representations—especially on social media. Despite these
challenges, any degree of local ownership in the process of
directing global attention to the situation in Lesvos would
contribute to a sense of local empowerment and demonstrate
recognition of the local impacts of foreign aid. While the specifics
of such a project are beyond the scope of this paper, this suggestion
offers an example of productive interplay between efforts towards
increased global solidarity and increased localization of aid.
Turning to CIGS’ second critique of established aid, the lack of
empathic relationality, these frustrations are aligned with Rorty’s
sentimentalist conceptualization of global solidarity to the
extent that the CIGS are criticizing a lack of sensitivity,
flexibility, and inclusion. CIGS’ resistance towards aid
strategies that do not prioritize an empathic form of global
solidarity are supported by Arampatzi’s argument that
solidarity distinguishes itself from charity through its
opposition towards “disembodied caring from a distance”
(2017, 2,161). Distance seems to represent the primary
obstacle to the motivation of global solidarity. Certainly, the
difficulty of motivating personal and empathic action that
addresses a crisis to which one has no obvious sense of
proximity, should not be underestimated.
Members of CIGS were open about the traumas of encountering
dead bodies, observing inhumane conditions, and hearing the
harrowing stories of refugees. For example, one volunteer
recounted the intensity of another woman’s experience:
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“She was doing an English lesson with a young man, that
starts telling her his journey, everything. And she was in
bits for the rest of the day. She couldn’t handle it. But she
cared and she heard him. She just needed help to get
through the day afterwards. And there’s a bit ofme say ‘Oh
oh oh, shouldn’t have let that happen’—professionally, but
then there is also the bit of me that says, ‘She’s people
helping people’”. (Patty, woman 50 years, 2018)
The personal connection between the volunteer and the young
man offers a clear example of the ability of solidarity to motivate one
to go beyond “disembodied caring from a distance”. Patty’s
reflections also demonstrate the potential for tension between
professionalization and horizontal empathy at the level of the
individual. This narrative demonstrates the potential that
personal interactions have for offering important forms of care,
but also the intensity of such experiences.
As argued earlier, the transformative nature of engaging distant
others in global solidarity canmake a formerly distant crisis one’s own
in an important sense. Recall that Taylor argued that all forms of
solidarity involve making the interests of a group central to one’s own
sense of well-being. However, in the interests of promoting the
localization of humanitarian aid and in the interests of avoiding
the reproduction of colonialist hierarchies, it must be acknowledged
that this process of “making the crisis one’s own” is often
unidirectional. In this context, this means that the benefits of CIGS
members’ transformative, solidary acts, that cause them to become
personally invested in a crisis, should not be measured in terms of the
eventual inclusion of these individuals in robust solidarities. Regardless
of the intensity of one’s commitment, the global solidarity of those
engaged in foreign aid should generally be conceptualized as
expressional.
Categorizing solidarity as “expressional” should not invoke
images of social media activism or simply paying lip service to a
cause. We argue that expressional global solidarity is by no means
detached caring from a distance, but it does imply not taking
unnecessary ownership of the aid process. Arguing that global
solidarity in humanitarian crises should remain expressional
prioritizes motivating unidirectional and personal identifications
with a cause and warns against either aspiring towards or
assuming multidirectional recognition of oneself as a member of
the robust solidary group. Through awareness of their structural
position within a crisis situation, outsiders can express global
solidarity without expressing a sense of ownership. A version of
this approach is present in the following reflections from a CIGS
member on her work with refugees in Lesvos:
“It’s not been a caring profession; it’s been a supporting
profession. It sounds like . . . I do care. I care passionately,
but I’m not a caretaker. I’m not there to take over, to do
everything. I’m there to send people on their way, and I
think that’s what people need here. To send people on their
way in the best possibleway.” (Patty, woman 50 years, 2018)
The idea of caring without assuming the role of a caretaker, neatly
captures the idea of making a crisis one’s own without identifying
with something larger than a supporting role—working in proximity
to a crisis without assuming that one’s proximity must warrant
robust membership of some kind. Especially if global solidarity and
the localization of aid are to be compatible, expressional global
solidarity appears to be what is called for in international responses
to humanitarian crises. Returning to Spandler’s description of the
localization of humanitarian aid as demanding “more ownership for
state and non-state actors in close proximity to the emergencies,”we
argue that the type of proximity that warrants this type of ownership
is membership in one of the robust solidary groups directly affected
by the crisis.
There are certainly other legitimate interpretations of proximity. The
speed with which many international CIGS organized and became
functioning parts of the local response in the early months of the crisis,
offers one example. Their frustrations with being dismissed by larger
organizations were likely connected to the degree of proximity to the
crisis that these CIGS had worked to develop. However, despite having
built relationships with locals during the initial crisis response, we argue
that this proximity is still unidirectional. By this we mean that the
proximity that was developed, the distance that was navigated in global
solidarity, was a matter of outsiders motivated to work towards the
interests of groups they were not members of.
We argue that the localization of humanitarian aid represents, in part,
spreading a reflexive awareness among outside actors that the goal of
global solidarity should be to motivate parallel efforts that support the
joint interests of thosemost affected, andwherever possible, do soon their
terms. Expressional global solidarity, when localized, does not imply any
decrease in commitment. Just as an important part of offering relational
support to a friend in crisis would be to avoidmaking the exchange about
oneself, the unidirectional nature of support offered to distant others in
expressional global solidarity does not entail a lack of wholehearted
empathy.We argue that if empathic responses to humanitarian crises are
to accommodate both global solidarity and local empowerment, the
primary challenge for outsiders lies in balancing the personal and
transformative experience of engaging in global solidarity with a
commitment to a supportive role that prioritizes the joint interests of
those with greater and more long-lasting proximity to these crises.
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